Abstract. To counteract the financial pressure emerging in aging societies, statutory pension schemes are undergoing fundamental reforms in many Western countries. Starting with cohort 1937, Germany introduced permanent pension deductions for early retirement. This study examines the profitability of pension contributions against the background of this reform for cohorts [1935][1936][1937][1938][1939][1940][1941][1942][1943][1944][1945]. Internal rates of return (IRR) are used to measure the profitability. For men, the IRR declines from 2.4% to 1.2% and for women from 5.2% to 3.7%. The results suggest that the majority of the trend, about 75-80%, is caused by increased pension contributions and not by the reform.
INTRODUCTION
Aging populations challenge the solvency of public pension systems in most modern welfare states. Many governments plan or respond with reforms that cut pensions, elevate the minimum retirement age or incentivize individuals to stay longer in the labor market. In Europe, many states opted for a variety of reforms, with many major reforms passed after the early 1990s.
1 A pioneering country is Germany, which announced a reform introducing permanent pension reductions for early retirement in 1992. 2 I analyze the rates of return on pension contributions in Germany against the background of this reform. Similar to many other welfare states, Germany has a Bismarckian pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system with a strong link between pensions and prior contributions. Thus, rates of return can serve as an indicator for the performance of the system. Evaluating pension reform effects on the rates of return can help to assess potential changes in citizens' attitudes toward the pension scheme. If reforms are too vigorous, they lower a PAYG-system's social acceptance and decrease the contribution base due to a decline in voluntary contributions and an increase in evasive behavior (B€ orsch-Supan and Reil-Held, 2001; Schnabel, 1998) . This can initiate a downward spiral. When evaluating a reforms' potential to cause such effects, it is necessary to document how well the pension system fares against alternative forms of investment like government bonds -both in general and post-reform. For such a comparison, the rates of return on pension contributions are needed. Rates of return are also interesting per se. Contributors want to know if the returns exceed inflation rates and/or if they are likely to do so in the future. Apart from fairness aspects, a low profitability always fuels discussions about privately defined or capital funded pension plans and indicates potential increases in the old-age poverty risk. Considering reform evaluations, effects on the rates of return are therefore important information for policy-makers.
The reform is gradually introduced for all cohorts born in 1937 and thereafter, exogenously determined by month and year of birth. Its potential effects are numerous. Hanel (2010) finds the reform to cause an average ten-month postponement in employment exit for the overall population. For employed men, B€ onke et al. (2014) find the reform to cause a 5.2-month postponement. The literature examining the relationship between retirement age and future pensions in an option-value framework (e.g. B€ orsch-Supan, 1992; Stock and Wise, 1990 ) also predicts a postponement. This view is shared by studies about the link between benefit-generosity and retirement timing (e.g. B€ orsch-Supan and Schnabel, 1998; Liebman et al., 2009) . The reform could also affect employment through the intensity of job search before retirement (Hairault et al., 2010) , resulting in extended periods of work and greater contributions. In addition, the reform could influence the likelihood of invalidity retirement (Riphahn, 1999) .
To measure the profitability of pension contributions, I apply the concept of internal rates of return (IRR), which is also suited to evaluate reform effects. The IRR can be seen as an interest rate on the contributions that is sufficient to generate enough funds to return the pensions until the (statistical) death of the individual. Thus, a higher IRR implies c.p. higher pensions. The approach condenses the profitability of pension contributions into a single number, allowing easy comparisons between distinctive groups like cohorts and sexes in different scenarios. I use individual level microdata and analyze the rates of return in two dimensions. In the intra-cohort dimension, individual profitability comparisons reveal how the pension system treats insurants relative to each other (e.g. men vs. women). In the inter-cohort dimension, those comparisons serve as evidence on the relative treatment of cohorts and lifetime redistribution through the pension system (Liebman, 2002; Schr€ oder, 2011) . Redistributive elements of PAYG-systems feature, for example, a redistribution from low to high life expectancy and from singles to married couples in case of survivor benefits.
There are not many studies on the individual IRR of pension systems. Especially those with microdata are extremely rare. Notable exceptions are Gustman and Steinmeier (2001) and Liebman (2002) , who look at redistributional effects of the US social security system. The only microdata study on Germany is Schr€ oder (2011) , who looks at the IRR of cohorts [1940] [1941] [1942] [1943] [1944] [1945] if and only if they retire in 2005. 3 Hence, the cohorts are included at a different age, preventing an inter-cohort comparison or a reform evaluation. For Germany, most other studies on the IRR and its evolution are based on extrapolations using stylized biographies (Ohsmann and Stolz, 2004; Schnabel, 1998; Schnabel and Ottnad, 2008) . However, selected earnings paths of hypothetical workers are not necessarily representative for the population (Bosworth et al., 2000) . In addition, the pension reductions introduced by the reform vary by retirement type. Therefore, individual selection into retirement types could be affected by the reform, which is currently not modeled by studies using hypothetical biographies.
The underlying dataset of this study, the Insurance Account Sample (Versicherungskontenstichprobe, VSKT), includes complete insurance biographies of the cohorts born between 1935 and 1945. It can address both the inter-and the intra-cohort dimension and does not suffer from the representation issues of hypothetical biographies.
The results from the intra-cohort dimension reveal that women have a higher IRR due to their greater life expectancy and because the pension system redistributes toward them. In the inter-cohort dimension, the results suggest a decrease of the real IRR for men from 2.4% to 1.19% and for women from 5.15% to 3.72% over the 1935-1945 cohorts. The reform does not solely cause the negative trend; a larger share is caused by increases in contributions rather than by lowered pensions. The outcomes indicate a potential increase in the old-age poverty risk for younger and subsequent cohorts if private pensions fail to provide nationwide coverage. Regarding the social acceptance of the pension scheme, the considered cohorts do not experience negative rates.
The study is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the dataset, the pension system and the reform. Section 3 explains the methodological framework. Section 4 provides the results of both the IRR and the reform effect. Section 5 looks at the overall development of pensions and contributions. Section 6 concludes.
DATA AND INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND

Data and sample
The German pension insurance records individual insurance accounts, which contain monthly information on inter alia (un-)employment, sick pay and pension contributions from age 14 up to a maximum of age 65. I use several waves of a sample of these biographies, the scientific use-files (SUF) of the Insurance Account Sample (Versicherungskontenstichprobe, VSKT). A SUFVSKT is a process produced stratified random sample of mandatorily insured individuals and contains about 60,000 observations each. Individuals are included if they are between 30 and 67 years of age in the reference year. Of those I select cohorts aged 66 or 67 (Table 1) . 4 The employment biographies are predominantly 3. The requirements on datasets for answering IRR-related questions are high. For an exact calculation of the IRR, lifelong employment biographies as well as the entire acquired pension entitlements are needed. Those typically deviate from the mere entitlements gained through labor (for an overview see B€ orsch-Supan and Reil-Held, 2001 ). 4. For younger cohorts, it is impossible to distinguish between old age and invalidity pensions after the 60th birthday.
consistently documented and, due to their administrative nature, virtually free of measurement errors (B€ onke et al., 2015) . The sample is restricted to native West Germans. Contributions of East Germans before the reunification are not comparable to those of West Germans. Furthermore, persons with distinctive pension systems like miners, civil servants and the self-employed are excluded as well as individuals without contributions or with more than 300 months of missing data (less than five years of information) in the main employment phase between 30 and 60; they do not offer enough information for an IRR calculation. More details on the sample selection are provided in Appendix A. As shown in Table 2 , the final sample consists of about 260 men and 390 women per cohort, with 2,901 men and 4,268 women in total. 5 The weighted values represent between 55% and 72% of the native West German population.
Retirement in Germany
The German statutory pension scheme offers various retirement possibilities depending on the retiree's individual situation. Since there is an old-age pension for women only, women and men have different pension prospects and are ana- Each pension type requires a different length of the waiting period, which is the number of years spent in the pension system (see Table 2 below). Since the VSKT lacks information on the pension type, I determine the type through a combination of the exact age of old-age retirement, periods of unemployment, invalidity or sick pay and the waiting period. More details and comparisons of sample and official population data (Verband Deutscher Rentenversicherungstr€ ager (VDR), 2004) are provided in Appendix A.
The 1992 pension reform
The cohorts considered are partly affected by a major pension reform in 1992. The reform aimed to secure the German statutory pension system's financial basis.
8 In addition to several -for the considered cohorts minor -changes, the reform introduces permanent pension deductions for early retirement compared to the previous/regular level. 9 After the reform, pensions are lowered by 0.3% times the number of month retiring before age 65 (63 for disabled individuals, Figure 1 and Table 2 ). The deductions are phased in and start at one month, 6. Waiting periods of 5, 10 and 15 years consist of contribution periods, periods of wage replacement benefits (unemployment, sick pay) and periods of child raising. Waiting periods of 35 years additionally include times of education or invalidity ( § § 50-62 in Bundesministerium der Justiz (BMJ), 2012). 7. Periods of compulsory contributions consist of contribution periods, periods wage-replacement benefits (unemployment, sick pay) and periods of child raising ( § 55 in Bundesministerium der Justiz (BMJ), 2012). 8. The reform was originally passed into law only two hours before the Berlin Wall fell in 1989.
Thus, further reforms and adjustments were needed during reunification process (Schm€ ahl, 2011) . A clear deduction of each reform step/adjustment is not possible due to partial overlap. Therefore, I carefully explain the deduction system and speak of 'the reform' in the following, meaning the reform in 1992 and follow-ups. 9. The reform also introduces a bonus of 0.5% per month for delaying retirement past 65 in combination with the regular old-age retirement. Since only a negligible number of people claim this bonus, it is not expanded upon here. Still it is included in the calculations.
respectively, 0.3% for persons born in January 1937 for certain retirement types. They increase for later born individuals by 0.3% per month up to a particular maximum depending on eligibility age and retirement type. The penalty level during phase-in is determined by the distance (in month times 0.3%) between the actual retirement age and the (type-and date of birth-specific) retirement age without deductions. The eligibility ages are not affected by the reform. After the reform is fully implemented, the maximal penalty amounts to 7.2% for longterm insured, 10.8% for disability and invalidity and 18% for unemployed and women. Figure 1 shows the minimum deduction-free retirement age depending on year and month of birth. The reform also introduces a non-old-age pension, the invalidity pension. It took effect in 2001 and is split into two types, full (100%) and partial (50%). At this, the share of receivers of full invalidity pensions amounts to about 80% (Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund, 2013) .
10 Invalidity pensions are deducted by 0.3% per month if retiring before 63, up to a maximum of 10.8%. The pensions are granted to about 20% of all retirees (Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund, 2013) . The applicants have to be younger than 65 years and unable to work for more than three hours (full) or three to six hours (partial) during the time they receive the pension. It is possible to end an invalidity pension and return to the labor market, but this is not common. An overview about the postreform state for all types of pension is given in Table 2 . Deductions did not exist pre-reform. Still, there is evidence that the deductions are not 'fair' and should be higher (Breyer and Hupfeld, 2010) .
Over the course the reform, the retirement age rises. Figure 2 shows the average old-age retirement age by cohort, showing an increase in the retirement age of the regarded cohorts by about five months.
Pension entitlements and earnings points
The annual pension, p j,t is determined by the pension formula ( § 64, Bundesministerium der Justiz (BMJ), 2012):
where m t depicts the number of months the pension was received in the respective year. For old-age pensions, m t always equals 12 in every year except the first , 2004-11 [sample] , own calculations using weighted data.
10. The full invalidity pension replaces the general disability pension (full pension) and the partial invalidity pension replaces the occupational disability pension (2/3 of the pension amount). The share of general disability pensioners also amounted to 80% (Riphahn, 1999) . When speaking of invalidity pensions in the following, its predecessors of general and occupational disability are meant as well.
year. A t denotes the current pension value (e.g. 27.20 € in 2010). The pension value is determined by various factors: the average wage, the contribution rate, the demographic development and the Riester-Faktor ( § 68, Bundesministerium der Justiz (BMJ), 2012). The Riester-Faktor lowers the pension value growth to limit the future contribution rate growth. The legislator expects investments in private pension schemes to compensate the lower statutory pensions (Clemens, 2011) . RA j depends on the pension type. It is 1 for old-age and full invalidity pensions and 0.5 for partial invalidity pensions (2/3 before 2001). Z j is the age factor, is introduced by the reform and contains the potential deductions due to early retirement. EP j represents the sum of the collected earnings points (EP). An EP is based on individual pension contributions divided by the average social security earnings in the respective year.
11
Not all EP stem from own contributions; periods of child raising, education and invalidity also increase the total number of EP. Those points can be credited in retrospect, so that the period of origin is not always discernible. B€ orsch-Supan and Reil-Held (2001) provide many details about these so-called transfer points and find that they are decreasing for younger cohorts. Divorces also affect the EP, because the economically stronger partner has to transfer some of his/her EP to the weaker partner.
12 Table 3 provides the sum of EP and transfer points by gender and cohort. On average, men acquired more EP than women, whereas women acquired more transfer points. The larger share of transfer points for woman causes, ceteris paribus, a higher IRR. There is no distinctive trend in transfer points or sum of EP for men, whereas women experience a slightly u-shaped development and a decline in the transfer points share. Thus, the effect of transfer points on the IRR is likely to be time invariant for men while it is slightly decreasing for women.
METHODOLOGY
The profitability of pension contributions is measured with the IRR. Intuitively, the approach computes an interest rate paid on the contributions, which is sufficient enough to pay out the stream of pensions received by an individual. The method assigns an interest rate to contributions and pensions equating both sides' net present values (NPVs). Here, it yields an interest rate, i, that equalizes the sum of contributions c and the expected value of pensions p in the year of retirement R. In the following yearX represents the year an individual reaches 11. Invalidity pensions are calculated on the basis of hypothetical EP, which retirees would have earned if they could continue to work. 12. The amount is determined as half of the EP difference of those points earned during the time of the marriage. Information about gains and losses due to divorces is included in the data. In the sample, a woman receives, on average, 0.9 EP and passes 0.014 EP, whereas a man receives, on average, 0.03 EP and passes 0.87 EP. As divorces usually cause other investment forms to be split up, those points are neither subtracted nor returned. The effect of divorces is omitted in a robustness test in Appendix C. In general, gender differences in the number of transfer points are only partly caused by divorces. Times of child rising get mainly credited to women, whereas men have longer periods of education.
age X. This has been chosen to simplify notation through independence of specific cohorts.
With: c j,a contributions of individual j in the year of age a c age-and year-specific factor compounding/discounting to the retirement year R p j,a pensions received of individual j in the year of age a / v,a survival probability of cohort v at age a (gender specific) i j individual-specific discount rate
The left-hand side of Equation 2 contains the sum of contributions from the year the individual turns 14 until the retirement year R (compounded to R). The right-hand side of Equation 2 depicts the pensions from R to year100 (discounted to R) and is split into two parts. The first term represents the sum of pensions ranging from R to year65. The second term includes the pensions ranging from year66 to year100. Each pension in this term is multiplied with the survival probability / v,a which constitutes the probability that the individual is still alive at age a (conditional on the individual being alive at 65). The survival probabilities are sex and cohort specific for West Germans (Federal Statistical Office, 2011) . Robustness checks considering differential mortality are based on Shkolnikov et al. (2008) and are shown in Appendix C, Figure C1 . The age-and year-specific discount factor c is based on the consumer price index. Contributions and pensions are real values to the base year R. 13 Each term in Equation 2 also includes the individual-specific discount factor i j (the IRR), which balances both sides and is computed from the data.
There is one necessary extension to Equation 2. Since the pension insurance spends about 20% of its retirement expenses on widow(er) pensions (Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund, 2013) , those should be included in the IRR computations. In Germany, widow(er)'s benefits ( § 46, Bundesministerium der Justiz (BMJ), 2012) 14 amount to 60% of the deceased partner's pension. An exact calculation requires information on the marital status and the partner's pension prospects. The VSKT lacks this information. Therefore, following Hanel (2010) , cohort-and gender-specific marriage rates, m v , are drawn from the SOEP (v27) for German natives. 15 These marriage rates depict the probability of being married at the age of 65. The partners' pension, w v,a , is assumed to be the average pension of an individual of the same cohort and the other sex, multiplied with the likelihood of being deceased for that person. 16 Hence, the total level of the widow(er)'s pension is based on 0.6 times the marriage probability, m v , times the pension level of a potential partner in case of her/his death w v,a . The average EP underlying this calculation are drawn by sex and cohort before any individuals are excluded.
The computation of Equation 3 requires assumptions on the development of the future pension level. One approach is to leave the pension value constant after 2013 and assumes a real pension growth of 0%, which is done as a robustness check in Appendix C. A more realistic prediction needs forecasts of the gross wage replacement rate of pensions and the real wage growth (baseline scenario). For the replacement rate, I rely on the 'Niveausicherungsklausel' ( § 154, Bundesministerium der Justiz (BMJ), 2012). Due to the demographic development, future rates are likely to decline and therefore the German legislature has set a minimum future rate. While the rate amounts to 50% in 2010, the law allows a decline to a minimum of 46% in 2020 and 43% in 2030. I assume a gradual decline of the rate by 0.007%, which leaves the rate just above the minimum 13. Experiments with hyperbolic social discount rates according to Weitzman (2001) caused a parallel shift of the IRR by about À2.3 percentage points. Since the trend was not affected, these results are not discussed here. 14. Here, only the 'major' widow(er)'s pension is regarded. Other survivor pensions, like the minor widow(er)'s pension, which starts before the age of 46, and the orphans' pension cannot be modeled appropriately and are not considered. 15. The SOEP is a highly representative annual household survey of the population living in Germany. 16. The SOEP further reveals that men are about two years older in marriages of the considered cohorts. Since two-year differences are not available for the all cohorts, the same cohorts are taken for consistency reasons. Empirical tests show that the EP differences between the cohorts (see Table 3 ) are too small to cause non-negligible deviations. Figure C2 in Appendix C provides robustness checks for varying marriage rates of 0% and 100%. Only minor level effects appear. Figure 3 shows the IRR development over the observed cohorts. 20 The mean IRR drops from 2.4% to 1.19% for men and from 5.15% to 3.72% for women (Figure 3a, b) . The differences between the sexes can be mainly ascribed to women's larger share of transfer points (see Table 2 ). The uneven distribution of transfer points also causes the more heterogeneous results of women (in line with Schr€ oder, 2011). Variations are caused by, for example, divorces or the number of children. Some further differences are caused by their higher live expectancy 21 and the favorable old-age pension for women (seized by about half of the women in the sample).
Rates of Return and Disincentives
RESULTS
22
In general, the German statutory system insures against two types of risk, longevity and invalidity. For those who utilize both insurances, a higher return is expected. Therefore, the mean IRR of individuals who start their retirement with invalidity pensions are singled out in Figure 3c and d. Both sexes start with a higher IRR and experience no visible trend over the cohorts. The higher IRR originates from shorter contribution and longer pension periods. In addition, the most likely follow-up pension type is the disability pension, which has the smallest deductions of all pension types. However, the Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund (2012) shows that invalidity pensioners are more affected by poverty risk 17. Holding the pension level constant after 2030 causes only minor deviations from the baseline results. These results are available from the author upon request. 18. The rates stem from the labor efficiency trends. In long-term projections, it is assumed that wages follow labor productivity (European Commission, 2006) . 19. This assumption is in line with the standard view about tax incidence. See Fullerton and Metcalf (2002) for an overview and Gruber (1997) for a validation through a natural experiment. However, the standard view has been recently challenged by Saez et al. (2012) . Therefore, a robustness check without the employer's share is provided in Appendix C to provide an upper and a lower bound. 20. Following Schr€ oder (2011), individuals with the highest and the lowest IRR (symmetry) are excluded due to extreme outliers at the top. Here, the results are censored at the 97.5% and the 2.5% level. For robustness, I also consider two further scenarios with varying groups. One only considers complete biographies without missing information in the main employment phase between 30 and 60. than the average population and that invalidity pensions are the only income for the majority of invalidity pensioners.
It is now important to determine if the downward trend shown in Figure 3a and b is caused by the reform or if other factors played a role, too. To measure the reform effect, I calculate two counterfactual scenarios (see Figure 4) . Figure 4a displays a comparison between the baseline scenario and a scenario without deductions, suppressing the reform effects. The phase-in of the reform for men born after 1937 and for women after 1939 is clearly visible (the old-age retirement for women is reformed only after 1939). The differences in the youngest cohorts amount to 0.2 percentage points for both sexes. This means that the direct reform effect causes 13% of the decline for women and 19% of the decline for men. Still, behavioral responses to the reform are likely to raise the retirement age due to a lower pension level (Figure 2 and e.g. B€ orsch-Supan, 1992; Hanel, 2010; Stock and Wise, 1990) , the intensity of job search before retirement (Hairault et al., 2010) , the choice of the retirement type, the tradeoff between unemployment benefits and disability pension and/or the entry likelihood in invalidity pensions in general (Riphahn, 1999) . Therefore, the direct effect is rather a lower bound of the reform impact. With a similar exercise, I intend to Note: The dashed line depicts the mean. Boxplot outliers are suppressed for reasons of clarity. Results are censored at the 2.5% and the 97.5% level. measure the upper bound of the reform. Figure 4b shows the differences between the baseline scenario and a situation which imposes the retirement deductions on all cohorts. The differences between the oldest cohorts' mean IRR under baseline condition and a situation under full reform should capture the reform effect without distortions through behavioral adjustments. The results suggest a difference of about 0.35 percentage points for both sexes, amounting to a reform effect of 20.1% for women and of 30% for men.
To examine the IRR development apart from the reform, Figure 4c shows a counterfactual comparison where all cohorts are retired artificially at age 60 (without deductions). Therefore, this scenario shows the time trend only. For the calculations, EP collected after the 60th birthday are subtracted and a hypothetical pension based on the EP earned up to the age of 60 is imputed. The differences between the 1935 and the 1945 cohort are about 1.14 percentage points for women and to 0.91 percentage points for men. The results are in line with those of Figure 4a 1935 1937 1939 1941 1943 1945 No reform differ greatly in magnitude between the cohorts and the sexes as can be expected from Figure 4 .
EXPLAINING THE TIME TREND
Since other changes to the pension scheme seem to cause a larger part of the IRR decline, this part sheds light on these developments. Figure 5 displays the NPVs of pensions and contributions, compounded/discounted to the year 2000 in real values. Figure 5 reveals a decline in the pension NPVs of men from 306,000 € to 286,000 €. Without deductions their sum increases slightly to 309,000 €. However, younger cohorts tend to live longer, which causes the IRR of equal sums to be lower for younger cohorts because their pensions are stretched over a longer timeframe. In the present case, mortality differences are not suited for an explanation since life expectancies grew only about one month per cohort. 23 For women, the picture is slightly different. Their sum of pensions stays roughly constant and circles around 180,000 €. Without reform there is a slight increase to 192,000 €. Figure 5 further depicts an increase in the sum of contributions, from 152,000 € to 199,000 € for men and from 48,000 € to 68,000 € for women. The relative changes in the sums of contributions are much larger than in the sums of the pensions, making it a likely explanation for a larger part of the declining IRR.
The monthly contributions are determined by the contribution rate and the contribution ceiling. The contribution rate is the income share paid to the statutory pension insurance. The contribution ceiling depicts the maximum amount to be paid. Multiplying both rate and ceiling yields the line of maximal contributions. increase of the maximal contributions over the considered timeframe. Further onetime payments, like Christmas money, became subject to social security contributions beginning in 1984, expanding the contribution base. 24 At the same time, the average social security wage approximately quadruplet.
The increases have greater effects on younger cohorts. To get more insight, Figure 7 displays the average contributions of selected cohorts over the life cycle. Figure 7a and c show the development of the average contributions in year 2000 real values over time for men and women. While the cohort's mean contributions start apart from each other, they get close in the early 1970s. The movement stays close until shortly before the respective retirement. On the contrary, Figure 7b and d reveal that while starting at about the same level of contributions, the younger cohorts face a higher real contribution burden from age 25 until retirement. Figures 7 and 5 also reveal that men contribute, on average, about three times as much as women.
Apart from pensions and contributions, the 'indirect costs' of the pension system have risen from about 20% in the 1960s to about 30% since 2003 (Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund, 2013, own calculations). As 'indirect costs' I render the expenditure share of the pension insurance financed by government subsidies. These costs cannot be directly linked to contributions, but if they could, the IRR would be lowered for all cohorts.
The IRR of the pension system is oftentimes compared to capital market interest rates (e.g. Schr€ oder, 2011). Such comparison reveals that both men and women would have been better off (on average), if they had invested their contributions in -assumedly approximately risk-free -German Federal Bonds. The interest rate of Federal Bonds since the 1950s exceeds the IRR of the pension system in most years, especially for men. However, the interest rates converge in recent years (see Figure E1 in Appendix E for a graphical comparison). Still these comparisons often miss a point: The pension system provides insurance and is not an interest paying investment. It mainly insures against longevity and inval- 24. This causes a structural break in administrative data covering earnings. The break is so pronounced that it is usually adjusted for in studies analyzing earnings inequality before and after 1984 (see Dustmann et al. (2009) for administrative employer data and B€ onke et al. (2015) for administrative pension data).
idity, which are risks worth paying an insurance premium for. Still this premium may not become overly high as this causes contributors to engage in avoidance behavior (B€ orsch-Supan and Reil-Held, 2001).
CONCLUSION
This study analyzes the development of the IRR for West German retirees in the 1935 through 1945 cohorts. For men, the IRR declines from 2.4% for the 1935 cohort to 1.19% for the 1945 cohort; for women it is from 5.15% to 3.72%. The downward trend is robust against major changes in the assumptions. The gender difference is mainly caused by the higher share of transfer points for women. Some smaller part is caused by their higher life expectancy and the old-age retirement for women. The IRR of invalidity retirees exceeds the respective cohort average for both sexes. The analysis takes place against the background of a reform, which gradually introduces permanent deductions for early retirement for cohorts born in 1937 and thereafter. Counterfactual comparisons suggest that the reform induces 19-30% of the decline for men and 13-20% of the decline for women. About 75% of the decline for men and about 81% of the decline for women seem to originate from increased contributions. The analysis considers only the direct and not the indirect costs from government subsidies. Furthermore, participants dying before 65 are not included. Both points reduce the IRR. But due to increases in the contribution rate, ceiling and base the IRR -however measured -will decline for future cohorts even without further reforms. Still, the pension system may not be evaluated on an IRR basis only, because it provides an insurance against longevity and disability. The insurance premium may just not become overly high as this has adverse effects on the contributors' base (B€ orsch-Supan and Reil-Held, 2001 ). Thus, a declining IRR lowers the acceptance of the system in general, which could cause a downward spiral. In addition, a small IRR increases the old-age poverty risk for subsequent cohorts if private pensions fail to fill this income gap. Therefore, close monitoring of the development of the IRR and private pension schemes should be regarded when designing future reforms and are an important task of future research.
APPENDIX A: -DATA -SAMPLE SELECTION AND RETIREMENT TYPE
A.1 SAMPLE SELECTION
The estimation procedure can obtain multiple IRR for individuals who shift their status between pensions and contributions (Schr€ oder, 2011), which is true for about 5% of the individuals in the sample. Those individuals are excluded since they get invalidity pensions for a limited time span, then do something else (e.g. employment, unemployment, mini-jobs) and, subsequently, obtain old-age pensions. Further women with marriage refunds are excluded (about 15% of the women in the sample). Until 1967, it was legally allowed for women to leave the pension system at the time of their marriage and gain the monetary value of their collected earnings points. Until 1995, however, these women could reenter the pension system through retroactive payments. This arrangement was extremely profitable: The contributions were assigned to earliest possible contribution periods (starting at age 14 or the year 1957) and in nominal values. Consequently those women have extremely high contributions at a very young age, which were paid in later years. Thus, only for these women the payment period and the contribution period do not overlap; a comparison to the rest of the sample is not meaningful.
A.2 RETIREMENT TYPE DETERMINATION
Determining which of the five possible old-age pensions an individual is receiving is not always unambiguous. If a person qualifies for multiple retirement types, I assign the most beneficial type (see Figure 1 for a ranking):
• The regular old-age pension is obvious and assigned to all individuals retiring after their 65th birthday.
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• The pension for long-term insured is assigned to all persons retiring between their 63rd and their 65th birthday, if they fulfill the waiting period of 35 years.
• Disability pensions are ascribed to individuals who formerly received invalidity pensions or sick pay after the age of 59 for at least one month. Sick pay is paid by the health insurance after being unable to work for three month in a row. I assume that both sick pay and invalidity pensions shortly before retirement sufficiently indicate a disablement.
• Unemployment pensions are assigned to persons who are unemployed for at least 12 months after being 58.5 years old. Unemployment pensions are also given to persons who do not qualify for other pensions, assuming a retirement due to the law about part-time work for employees over 55. About 10% of the men (and a negligible amount of women) in the sample do not qualify for any pension with the approaches discussed above. Of those men nearly all (96%) retire before the age of 63, making them eligible only for unemployment or disability retirement. This leads to an imprecision between these two kinds of pension, because some of these males might actually retire with a disability pension.
• The old-age pension for women is assigned to women who have accumulated at least 120 months of compulsory contributions after their 40th birthday.
In case of invalidity pensions, there is no way of distinguishing between full and partial invalidity in the sample. Following for example Riphahn (1999) , the full pension is assigned to all invalidity pension recipients. This results in an overestimation of the invalidity pensions for about 20% of the recipients. For the great majority the overestimation amounts to 1/3 of the pension amount, because invalidity pensions initially received before 2001 are treated according to the pre-reform state. In the final sample 13.55% of men and 10.43% of women received invalidity pensions. The annual level of invalidity pensions is approxi- mated by accumulating the entire credited earnings points 1 up to the respective year and multiplying them with the pension value and the number of months the pension is received in the respective year. Figure A1 shows the retirement type for different male cohorts in the exemplary year 2003. Figure A1 compares the observed values (right panel) to the actual values from the pension statistics (left panel). Regular old-age pensions are depicted correctly in the data. Also the sample shares of long-term insured for the cohorts 1939 and 1940 (age 64 and 63) match the actual data quite well. The sample shares for unemployment and disability pension show some deviations, which could result from a partial mix up between unemployment and disability pensions. Details for the retirement by cohort and retirement type in the year 2003 are provided in Table A1 -A4. The comparison between the sample and the actual shares reveals a reasonable fit. Still the low number of observations in some cells potentially causes deviations from the actual values, which is especially true for women: In 2003 over 90% of the women in the sample retire either through the old-age retirement for women or the regular old-age pension, making Figure A1 superfluous for women. Figure C2 shows results for varying marriage rates (m v = 0 or 1) and compares it those obtained from the SOEP. The trends are stable again. For men, a rate of 0 results in an IRR loss of about 0.1 percentage points and a rate of 1 in a gain of about 0.08. For women, the effects are much larger as they are both more likely to receive survivor benefits and also receive a greater amount. Here, a rate of 0 results in a drop of about 0.6 percentage points and a rate of 1 in a gain of about 0.2. Figure C3 shows the IRR of cohort-and year-specific means in comparison with the baseline estimation. The cohort-specific means are drawn with jackknife, which always excludes one observation and then calculates the mean. This creates as many means as there are observations in the underlying sample. Those are used in the estimation procedure described above. The IRR of the cohort 2. The study of Shkolnikov et al. (2008) is based on administrative pension data. Other mortality rates cannot be applied because of missing information on earnings apart from social security earnings. This causes the mortality curve of administrative pension data to be j-shaped instead of increasing in the number of collected earnings points: Persons in the lowest quintile often draw income from other sources than social security employment, causing them to do better (income wise) than the second quintile. means are 0.05 (men) and about 0.6 (women) percentage points lower than the baseline estimates. The differences are significant at the 95% level for women, confirming Figure 3 with a greater spread in the IRR of women. by the reform, its counterfactual is an artificial reform implementation. Because the reform introduction has negative impacts on the cohort 1935, the signs are reversed for visual convenience. The second panels (b) depict the difference between the baseline scenarios and a scenario where all cohorts are retired at 60 without disincentives (as described in the main text). 
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